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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER PRESTON BOGESS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16894

-vsLAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Appellant.

------

.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah is appealing the granting of a
writ of habeas corpus which was granted because respondent's
(petitioner therein) attorney failed to file a timely appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District, the Honorable David K.
Winder presiding, ordered that if this Court did not take
jurisdiction of respondent's out-of-time appeal by January 6,
1980, he was to be released and his conviction of manslaughter,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953, as amended),
was to be set aside on that date.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the granting-of the writ
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of habeas corpus and requests that this Court take

jurisdicti~~
~

of an out-of-time appeal by respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent, Walter Boggess, was tried for second
degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953,
as amended) on May 18, 1978, before the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock of the Fourth Judicial District.

The following facts

were presented at the hearing on respondent's writ of habeas
corpus before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. of the
Third Judicial District on November 30, 1978.
After discussing ;the various degrees of murder,
manslaughter and negligent homicide with respondent,

(T.

10,14)~:

appointed counsel, George Mangan, concluded that manslaughter,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953, as amended), was "the only
justifiable lesser included offense,"
that the6ry at trial.
on May 19, 1978.

(T. 11) and he pursued

Respondent was convicted of manslaughter!

Prior to sentencing and again at the sentencii!

hearing, respondent told Mangan that he was satisfied with the
jury's verdict and that he did not wish to appeal

(T. 12,13).

Later, in a letter dated July 10, 1978, respondent requested
that Mangan file an appeal in his behalf (T.5). Respondent
testified that he first learned of the offense of negligent
homicide, Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-206 (1953, as amended), while
in prison,

(T. 4) , and he believed the trial court erred in not
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instructing the jury as to this lesser included offense.
Mangan testified that he received the letter on July 18,
1978 and that he had sufficient time in which to file an
appeal by the July 20, 1978 deadline (T.13).
Mangan informed respondent that there was no
merit to an appeal and that he was no longer respondent's
attorney.

Mangan did not file a notice of appeal.

Respondent

also wrote to Uintah County to request that a transcript
be prepared,

(T.7), and he wrote a follow-up letter to Mangan

on July 23, 1978 to inform him of this.

On August 30, 1978,

respondent filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus and
post conviction relief alleging inter alia, that he had been
denied his right to appeal.

On November 30, 1978, the

Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., ruled that respondent had
been denied his right to appeal and his right to counsel
under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.

Following a stipulation by the State, Judge

Baldwin granted respondent permission to file an out-of-time
appeal.

On October 16, 1979, this Court refused to take

jurisdiction of the appeal based on Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5
(1953, as amended).

State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979).

On December 6, 1979, the Honorable David K. Winder
ordered that if the Utah Supreme Court did not take jurisdiction
of the substantive merits of an appeal by respondent within
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thirty days, respondent's Petition for a Writ of Habeas
corpus would be granted.

On January 6,. 1980, the writ

was granted, respondent was released from prison and his
conviction set aside.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GRANTING OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A

BY STRICTLY CONSTRUING THE
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
OF UTAH COD~ ANN. §77-39-5
(1953, AS AMENDED), THIS
COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT INVOLVED.
Although there is no inherent or absolute right to
appeal a criminal conviction, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687

(1894), once the state has granted the privilege of appeal,,

in a proper case, i.e. where the appellant has met the state's
requirements for perfecting an appeal, the appeal becomes a
"matter of right."

Alaska Packer's Ass'n. v. Pillsbury, 301

U.S. 174, 177 (1937).

See, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,

610-611 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963)
This right for indigent defendants has been more fully defined
in recent years.

Once appellate review becomes an integral

part of a state's criminal system, an indigent is protected
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at all stages by the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955), and he may not
be barred access to any phase of the appellate process.
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959).

B
AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO
APPEAL IS GUARANTEED
UNDER ANDERS V. CALIFORNIA.
When a defendant claims that he has been denied his
right to appeal he raises two questions.

First, did the

defendant request that his attorney file an appeal, or, if
--

not, should his attorney have realized that an appeal may have
some merit?

If the answer to either of the above inquiries

is yes, then the second question is why wasn't an appeal
filed?

Whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional

right in such a situation depends on the facts of each case.
See, State v. Carter, 551 P.2d 821, 827
v. State, 536 P.2d 945, 950

(Kan. 1976); Wimberli

(Okla. 1975); State v. Heath, 27

Utah 2d 13, 16, 492 P.2d 978, 980 (1972).
If the defendant and his attorney made a tactical
decision not to appeal, or reached the conclusion that an
appeal would be unavailing, and consequently did not file
notice of appeal within one month after the entry of the
judgment appealed from, Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5 (1953),

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

then the defendant has not been denied his right to appeal
and he is precluded from substituting a writ of habeas corpus
for a timely appeal.

In Short v. Smith, 550 P.2d 204 (Utah

1976), the defendant, who had been convicted of forgery,
failed to perfect an appeal within the statutory period but
later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that
he should have been convicted only of a misdemeanor and not
of a felony.

This Court found the appeal from the denial of

the writ to be without merit, stating, "he cannot substitute
a habeas corpus proceeding for an orderly, statutory appeal."
Id. at 204.

Accord, Ex parte Dixon, 264 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1953);

Mahaffey v. State, 392 P.2d 423, 425 (Idaho 1964).
In the instant case, respondent requested that his
attorney file an appeal.

No appeal was filed by Mangan because

he believed he was no longer respondent's attorney and because
he thought it was a waste of time.

The duty of appointed

counsel in such a situation has been clarified by Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), and its progeny.

In Anders,

appointed counsel in a letter to the appellate court stated:
"I will not file a brief on appeal as I am of the opinion that
there is no merit to the appeal." Id. at 742.

In the instant

case, appointed counsel's letter of May 18, 1978 stated:

"In

good conscience, I cannot prosecute an appeal for you . • . I
don't believe there is any basis for an appeal."

(Ex. 3-P).
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The United States Supreme Court's solution to the dilemma
faced by appointed counsel is:
. • . if counsel finds his case to be
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise
the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must however,
be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal.
Counsel is also required to include
which defendant wishes to raise.

Id. at 744.

any points
The court

will then examine the points raised and if any are found to
have merit, defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed
to aid him on appeal. Id. at 744.

c
RESPONDENT BELIEVED THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
THIS ERROR MAY ONLY BE RAISED
ON APPEAL.
The difference between habeas corpus and appeal is
clear.

The remedy for any claimed error or irregularity at

trial, is to seek review and correction on appeal.

Generally,

habeas corpus is designed to provide speedy release from
illegal incarceration and may not be used to review a conviction
in lieu of an appeal.
If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the
partv at the time the judgment was entered,
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it must be reviewed in the manner and
within the time permitted by regular
prescribed procedure, or the judgment
becomes final and is not subject to
further attack, • • • Were it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure
governing appeals and the limitations
of time specified therein would be
rendered impotent.

It

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968).
Accord, Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1980);
Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696, 697
Smith, 547 P.2d 697, 698

(Utah 1976); Maguire v.

(Utah 1976).

This Court has stated, however, that a final judgmen1~I
may be subject to habeas

c~rpus

attack under the "most unusualm

circumstances," such as where "there has been substantial
failure to accord the accused due process of law; • . • or
some other such circumstance that it would be wholly unconsioncj
not to re-examine the conviction."

Gallegos v. Turner, 17

Utah 2d 273, 275, 409 P.2d 386, 387 (1965),

(following full

appellant review); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98, 440 P.2c1
968, 969

(1968),

(where defendant failed to appeal within the

statutory period) .
In the instant case, respondent claims that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of negligent homicide.
(1953) states, "

Utah Code Ann. § 77-37

. Exceptions to instructions to the jury

shall be taken and preserved as in civil cases."

Generally,
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Utah R. Civ. P.

51 requires that the complaining party object

to the instruction at the trial level, or he will be precluded
from raising the objection on appeal.

DeBry and Hilton Travel

v. Capitol Intern. Airways, 583 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1978);
Cordner v. Clinger's Incorporated, 15 Utah 2d 85, 87, 387 P.2d
685, 686 (1963).
Since Rule 51 requires that an exception be made to
the instruction at trial, it follows that the claimed error
"is something which is known or should be known" at the time
of trial, and therefore must be reviewed on appeal and may
not be collaterally attacked through a writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 51, also gives the appellate court discretion to hear
the objection, raised first on appeal, in the interests of
justice.

Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 64, 475 P.2d 839,

840 (1970); Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427 429, 403 P.2d
166, 167 (1965).
criminal cases.
p • 2d 2 8 5 ,

286

This Court has applied this same standard in
State v. Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494

( 19 7 2) •

The unusual circumstances, in the instant case,
which urge review of the error initially asserted on appeal,
is the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent claims that Mangan negligently failed
to request an instruction regarding negligent homicide.
Ineffective assistance of counsel may explain why no exception
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was taken at trial and compel the appellate court, in the
interests of justice, to hear an objection that is first
raised on appeal.

Utah R. Civ. P. 51.

Even though ineffectiv
!1

assistance of counsel warrants review of the alleged error
on appeal, it does not necessarily justify resort to a writ
of habeas corpus by respondent.

Where ineffective represen-

tation reaches constitutional proportions, resort to habeas
corpus may be warranted.

The old standard for resort to

habeas corpus was that counsel must be so ineffective that
the trial is reduced to a sham and a mockery of justice.
E.g., Barron v. State, 437JP.2d 975, 977 (Ariz.
v. King, 142 S.E.2d 880, 882 (W.Va. 1965).

1968)~

State

Recent cases

have adopted the stricter standard of reasonably competent
assistance.

Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980);

People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979).

This Court

has addressed the question in several recent cases.

In

State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), the Court
required that the attorney provide competent assistance,
Id. at 204, but held in that case that the trial had not
been reduced to "a farce, or a sham."

Id. at 205.

And in

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979), the Court moved
closer to the stricter standard when it stated:
We do not mean to be understood as
saying that a defendant can only
succeed in showing that he was
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deprived of counsel by showing that
his attorney's failures reduced his
trial to "a farce or a mockery of
justice."
Id. at 920 n.5.
But where the actions of the attorney involve elements of
discretion or judgement, they will not consitute ineffective
assistance sufficient to sustain habeas corpus relief.

E.g.,

Landers v. State, 437 P.2d 681, 682 (Ariz. 1968); Thomas v.
Rhay, 472 P.2d 606, 607

(Wash. 1970).

In the instant case, prior to trial, Mangan discussed
the various degrees of murder, manslaughter and negligent
homicide with respondent at length.

After hearing respondent's

statement of facts, Mangan exercised his judgment, and coneluded that the only lesser included offense which could be
justified was manslaughter.

Comparing the facts of a case

to the elements of an offense, clearly calls upon an attorney
to exercise this kind of judgment.

Additionally, Mangan, at

respondent's request, attempted to arrange for a guilty plea
to a reduced change of manslaughter.

(T.10).

Mangan's

representation of respondent was neither perfunctory nor
ineffective.
The facts in this case do not support the conclusion
that respondent was denied reasonably competent assistance
of counsel or that his trial was a sham and a mockery of
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justice, therefore defendant may not resort to a writ of
ioi

habeas corpus in order to have his claimed error reviewed.
However, Utah R. Civ. P. 51, all.ows for review of that same
error on appeal "in the interests of justice."

The standard

on appeal is simply what the appellate court considers to be
wil

fair, while for a writ of habeas corpus respondent must
prove that counsel was not reasonably competent and that
if he had been, there was a "reasonable likelihood of a
different result."

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah

197~

D

RELEASING D~FENDANT AND
SETTING ASIDE HIS CONVICTION, IS NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY.
Respondent desired to appeal his conviction, he had
an issue which could only be properly raised on appeal and no
appeal was filed by his appointed counsel.

:i
M

Respondent's

right to appeal has not been denied through any fault of the
State.

Upon learning the facts of this case, the State

attempted to aid respondent and the interest of justice by
stipulating to a late appeal.

The result in this case,

releasing respondent and setting aside his conviction, is
wholly untenable.

Granting defendants a second day in court,

where they and their counsel are solely respor.sible for any
constitutional defects in the conviction, places an unreasonabl
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strain on the prosecutorial resources of the state.

The

constitutional defect can arise from an honest mistake or
miscommunication between respondent and his attorney.

For

example:
1)

Even if we assume that all appointed attorneys

will understand the duty imposed on them by Anders v. California,
a delay may still occur, as it did here, where the attorney
believed his representation to be at an end.
2)

If Mangan had been out of town on July 18, 1978

and had not returned until after the one month period had run,
respondent would have been denied his right to appeal.
3)

A similar result would occur if the attorney

became suddenly ill, or if the notice of appeal was simply
misplaced in his office.

Effective and efficient law enforcement

dictates the need for some alternative to a full retrial of
the defendant in such situations.
The result in this case allows for subterfuge by
future defendants.
4)

A defendant may vacillate in his requests for

an appeal to such a degree that his attorney may conclude
that the defendant did not want to appeal.

After the one

month period has expired, the defendant may claim he did
wish to appeal and that he had so instructed his attorney.
5)

At the time of sentencing, a defendant can inform
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the court that he intends to appeal and later allow counsel
to convince him that an appeal is pointless.

Once the

statutory period runs, the defendant can point to his statement in the record and allege that his attorney was negligent.
6)

~

A defendant and his unscrupulous attorney, or

his simply over-zealous attorney who honestly believes in
the innocence of his client, can agree that the attorney will ~
admit to negligently failing to file the requested notice of
appeal in order to give the defendant a second chance at trial. 1
In any of these factual settings, the defendant will (
be undermining the eff icie~cy of and respect for the legal
system.

Through no fault of the State, prosecutorial resources:

will be wasted in seeking a second conviction.

That portion

of the public which is aware of the defendant's crime and
conviction, will lose respect for and faith in our legal systerr
when they observe, as we have here, a convicted killer back
on the street so soon after his conviction.
Some alternative, to releasing respondent and setting
aside his conviction, which will protect both his·constitutiona
rights and the interests of the State must be found.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PRINCIPLE
OF CONSTRUCTIVE FILING OF NOTICE OF
APPEAL IN ORDER TO TAKE JURISDICTION
OF LATE APPEALS IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE.

-14-
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In Utah, perfection of an appeal is jurisdictional.
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927, 929

(Utah 1979); Sullivan v.

District Court, 65 Utah 400, 404, 237 P. 516, 518 (1925).
Generally, courts have no inherent power to extend the time
for taking an appeal, Blackwelder v. Naylor, 439 P.2d 202,
203 (Okla. 1967),

(a civil case), but that power may be conferred

upon the court by statute.
323, 323 (Cal. 1965),

E.g., People v. Krebs, 400 P.2d

(in which the California Rules of Court,

at that time, allowed for "relief from default in a proper
case."); City of Goldendale v. Graves, 562 P.2d 1272, 1276
(Wash. 1977),

(in which the statute allowed the court to take

jurisdiction where failure to file a timely appeal was due
to "excusable neglect.").
Where no such statutory power exists, a potential
solution lies in the principle of constructive filing of
notice of appeal.

This principle had its beginning in People

v. Slobodion, 181 P.2d 868

(Cal. 1947), in which an incarcerated

defendant delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities
for mailing to the clerk of the court, six days prior to the
last day of the statutory period for filing.

Due to the

neglect of prison officials, the notice was not received by
the clerk until five days after the period had run.
principle was based on a notion of estoppel.

The

"It would be

absurd to hold in a criminal case that the state may extend
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the right of appeal contingent upon timely pursuit thereof
and then deny such fundamental right because the state's
employees were remiss in complying with the state's law."
Id. at 871.

The court said that both justice and reason

require that the appellant not be deprived of his right
to appeal where he had taken all steps he was individually
able to, and where the delay was not due to any fault of
his.

Appellant's actions under such circumstances constituted

constructive filing of notice of appeal.

Id. at 871.

The principle was expanded in People v. Dailey, 345
P.2d 558 (Cal. 1959), to

i~clude

the situation where an

incarcerated appellant delivers his notice of appeal to prison
officials on the last day on which the appeal may be filed,
even though it would necessarily reach the clerk of the
court after the period had run.

This was to assure that

an incarcerated appellant had the same ten day appeal period
as did an individual who was not in prison.
The principle was applied to a factual situation
similar to that of the instant case in Re Benoit, 514 P.2d 47
{Cal. 1973).

In that case, the court acknowledged that under

California law, appellate review is jurisdictional and that
California statutes do not expressly allow consideration of
late appeals.

Further, the court noted that, the statutory

period for appeal had recently been changed from ten to sixty
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days, and Rule 250, California Rules of Court, which requires
the judge at the time of sentencing "to advise defendant of
his right to appeal, of the time and necessary steps for
taking an appeal, and of the right of an indigent appellant
to have counsel appointed for him . . • ,"had recently been
adopted.

These changes were expressly designed to eliminate

the causes of late appeals.

Id. at 105.

Nevertheless, these

alterations did not preclude the use of the principle of
constructive filing which "embodies nothing more than a basis
for judicial acceptance of an excuse for the appellant's
delay in order to do justice."

Id. at 104.

In Benoit, the

appellant requested that his appointed counsel file an appeal
following his first conviction.

No timely appeal was made

due to the confusion generated by appellant being immediately
removed to a second county where he was represented by
different appointed counsel and tried for an unrelated felony.
The court found earlier cases to be distinguishable in that
each involved state action through prison employees who
either prevented the appellant from filing a timely appeal
or induced the appellant to rely upon their representations
of assistance and lulled him into a false sense of security.
Id. at 106.

Also, in each case, the delay was not substantially

due to any fault of appellant.

In Benoit, the delay was not

through any fault of the state, but resulted from a lack of
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communication between appellant and his first appointed
counsel, . who said he would file the appeal and later

·1.u

mistakenly believed that appellant's second appointed
counsel would perfect the appeal.

The court said that __

appellant was even more justified in relying on the statements of his own attorney than were earlier appellants in
relying on prison officials,

since his own attorney was

better acquainted with the law and more likely to be concerned
with the appellant's cause.

Id. at 106.

The court further

required that appellant explain any delay in requesting an
appeal and that he diligently pursue the appeal once the
request had been made of his attorney.

Id. at 107.

Accord,

People v. Leftwich, 158 Cal. Rptr. 758, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
6 (1979).
In the instant case, Mangan, received a written
request from respondent that an appeal be filed.

Mangan

testified that he had time to file an appeal before the
July 20th deadline.

Due to a misunderstanding regarding his

continued role as respondent's attorney, no appeal was filed
within the statutory period.

The District Court accepted

respondent's explanation that the delay in requesting an
appeal was due to respondent's lack of knowledge of the
offense of negligent homicide.

Once respondent had made a

timely request of his attorney, he diligently pursued the
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appeal by immediately requesting a copy of his transcript
and by writing a followup letter to Mangan to inform him of
this.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
adopt the principle of constructive filing of notice of
appeal.

This will not entail a significant departure from

the statutory one month period in which an appeal must be
filed.

An appellant is still required to request that his

attorney file an appeal early enough to allow the attorney
time to file within the statutory period.

Nor will this

encourage laxity on the part of appellant and his counsel
since

appelld~t

must explain any delay and exercise reasonable

diligence in perfecting the appeal once he has requested it.
In fact, this will encourage prompt filing since an appellant
will no longer profit by failing to file, whether due to
mistake or subterfuge, and seeking a writ of habeas corpus
claiming he was denied the right to appeal.
Respondent, herein, over the advise of counsel,
decided to take an appeal.

He was able to explain the delay

and demonstrate his diligence to the satisfaction of the
district court.

He did all he was individually capable of

doing and then relied on his appointed counsel to complete
his assigned duties.

It would not only be unjust to hold

defendant accountable for the negligence of his appointed
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attorney, it might very well violate his constitutional
rights.
By adopting the principle of constructive filing
of notice of appeal and accepting an out-of-time appeal
under the proper circumstances, this Court would not be
expanding the constitutional rights of appellants.

More

correctly, this Court would be guaranteeing that the rights
of an indigent appellant will not be compromised by the
negligence or misunderstanding of his appointed counsel.
The principle of constructive filing will also
be of benefit to the state.

In light of this Court's prior

decision not to take jurisdiction of an out-of-time appeal,
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979), the state is
given the choice of acquiescing in the freedom of a convicted
killer or incurring the time and expense of a second trial.
This would also eliminate the potential for subterfuge by a
defendant seeking a second opportunity for acquittal.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's right to appeal is not controlled solely
by jurisdictional considerations, but also involves constitutic
issues.

Under Anders v. California, appointed counsel must

aid an indigent with his appeal, even if counsel believes
the appeal to be without merit.

Mr. Boggess, an indigent

defendant desired and requested that his conviction be

-20-
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appealed.

He has raised an issue from his trial that can

only be properly heard on appeal, and not in a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.

Appointed counsel's failure to

file a appeal has denied defendant his constitutional rights.
Where this has occurred through no fault of the state, some
remedy must be fashioned which will protect the rights of
the defendant as well as the interests of the state.
The principle of constructive filing of notice of
appeal is such a remedy.

The defendant is still bound to

file within one month of the judgment appealed from, but
where something delays or prevents the attorney from carrying
out the instructions of his client, the defendant will be
deemed to have filed within the statutory period, as long as
he, 1) adequately explains the delay, 2) demonstrates his
diligence in pursuing the appeal through his appointed counsel
and 3) gives his attorney sufficient time to file notice of
appeal after the request is made.
Both

the State and future defendants will benefit

from the adoption of this principle.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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